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Philosophers of biology tend to believe that biological information is not adequately captured by 
Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication. In their recent paper, Bergstrom and Rosvall 
(2011a) object to this trend and propose a ‘transmission view of information’, which is intended 
to retain and employ Shannon’s insights. In their response to commentaries (Godfrey-Smith, 
2011; Maclaurin, 2011; Shea, 2011), Bergstrom and Rosvall offer the following formulation of 
the transmission view: 
 
[TMV]: “An object X conveys information if the function of X is to reduce, by virtue of 
its combinatorial properties, uncertainty on the part of an agent who observes X”  
(Bergstrom & Rosvall, 2011b, p. 198, this is the refined version, in which ‘combinatorial’ 
properties replace the ‘sequential’ properties of the original version) 
 
Bergstrom and Rosvall often write about genes or DNA, observing that “[in] biology genetic 
transmission occurs vertically (from parent to offspring to grandoffspring). It is upon this axis that 
the transmission sense of information focuses” (Bergstrom & Rosvall, 2011a, legend to fig. 2, p. 
165). Framing the transmission view around genes and intergenerational relations suggests that its 
primary target are the genetic (and non-genetic) factors of inheritance. Yet Bergstrom and 
Rosvall’s wider goal appears to be that the transmission view should apply to all kinds of 
biological information. For instance, TMV makes no explicit reference to inheritance factors, 
referring generically to “an object X” instead. Furthermore, Bergstrom and Rosvall (2011a) hope 
that by focusing on intergenerational transmission, they “can make sense of a large fraction of the 
use of information language in biology” (p. 165). Bergstrom and Rosvall also emphasise, in their 
response to commentaries, that we should think of the transmission view as a diagnostic tool 
rather than an account of (a certain kind of) information. The view is intended to determine the 
presence of information by offering a set of criteria for identifying information carriers, while 
bracketing potentially thorny issues about its content. Both these points are summarised in the 
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remark that the transmission view “simply offers the tools to diagnose biological information 
where ever it can be found [...]” (Bergstrom & Rosvall, 2011b, p. 197).  
This note focuses on the two components of the transmission view, the reduction in uncertainty 
and the appeal to function.  
 
(1) Reduction in uncertainty. It is natural to interpret uncertainty reduction as being somehow 
connected to Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication, especially to mutual information. 
After all, Bergman and Rosvall (2011a) wish to employ Shannon’s theory, and mutual 
information is the key quantity for present purposes (we can exclude psychological states, like 
feelings of uncertainty, because ‘agents’ are meant to include objects like cells). Bergman and 
Rosvall say little about how TMV is meant to integrate uncertainty with Shannon’s theory, thus 
inviting a number of possible concretisations. One is to cash out uncertainty reduction in terms of 
non-zero mutual information, as has been done before (Halliday, 1983):  
 
[TMV*]: An object X conveys information if the function of X is to have, by virtue of its 
combinatorial properties, non-zero mutual information with an agent who observes X.  
(the reference to combinatorial properties introduces unnecessary restrictions, but is 
retained here in order to remain close to TMV) 
 
This would amount to something close to Wiley’s (1983) ‘transmitted information’. Note that X’s 
satisfying these criteria would establish that X has the function to influence the agent’s behaviour, 
but not that this happened because semantic information was transmitted (cf. Slater, 1983). 
Another way to make the connection explicit is to add mutual information to TMV: 
 
[TMV**]: An object X conveys information if the function of X is to reduce, by virtue of 
its combinatorial properties and non-zero mutual information with some feature Y, 
uncertainty on the part of an agent who observes X 
 
This elaboration of TMV may be closer to Bergstrom and Rosvall’s intentions, because it appears 
to fit with their example of a practical application of the transinformation view. In the example 
(Bergstrom & Rosvall, 2011a, p. 170), neuronal spike trains were measured to have non-zero 
mutual information with stimuli and it is plausible to assume that Bergstrom and Rosvall take 
spike trains to have the function to reduce the uncertainty of higher-level brain regions. Note, 
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however, that on this interpretation the reduction in uncertainty is not operationalised and remains 
essentially metaphoric. This may well reduce the usefulness of the transmission view as an 
effective diagnostic tool. Both elaborations of TMV are subject to some general difficulties with 
applying Shannon’s measures in biological contexts (Pfeifer, 2007).  
Another point worth emphasising is that TMV allows an altogether different approach to cash out 
uncertainty, one which is gaining ground in animal behaviour studies: statistical decision theory 
(SDT). Animals routinely need to make decisions about how to act, often based on incomplete 
information about relevant states of the world. The challenge is solved partly by attending to the 
environment and gathering knowledge about the probability of certain events. In particular, 
animals can use current perceptions to update their background knowledge about events. 
Background knowledge stems from earlier experiences and/or evolutionary history. SDT employs 
Bayes’ theorem to derive posterior probabilities, and the difference between posterior and prior 
probabilities is understood as measuring the animal’s uncertainty reduction about the state whose 
probability is being updated (e.g. Bradbury & Vehrencamp, 1998; 2011; see also Danchin et al., 
2004; McNamara & Dall, 2010; Skyrms, 2010). On this approach, TMV could be refined as 
follows: 
 
[TMV***]: An object X conveys information if the function of X is to change, by virtue 
of its combinatorial properties, an agent’s probability estimate of some state Y 
 
Bergstrom is open to this take on uncertainty (pers. comm.). Keeping the two approaches apart is 
important, not least because applying them as diagnostic tools requires different methods. For 
instance, choosing a Shannon approach will require measuring the relative frequencies of signals 
and some other states (as in the neurobiology example). Choosing the SDT approach will require 
developing quantitative models in order to generate predictions about probabilities (among other 
things).   
 
(2) Functions. Bergstrom and Rosvall (2011a) exclude from the remit of the transmission view 
instances in which X lacks the etiological function to reduce uncertainty. The underlying rationale 
here seems to be a contrast between the transmission view and the “causal sense of information” 
(p. 168). Bergstrom and Rosvall characterise causal information in terms of mutual information, 
where mutual information is merely a “descriptive statistics for correlations” (legend to fig. 1, p. 
161). To the extent Shannon’s theory is deployed simply as a measure of correlations, it fails to 
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address what they regard as its original task: to address the “packaging of information for 
transport” (p. 162) from senders to receivers across time and/or space. Bergstrom and Rosvall’s 
move of supplementing Shannon’s theory with an appeal to X’s etiological function is their 
attempt to equip the theory for this task. But if the overall goal is to develop a tracking tool for 
“biological information where ever it can be found” (Bergstrom & Rosvall, 2011b, p. 197), then 
the inclusion of function is both unnecessary and unduly restrictive. In animal behaviour studies, 
for example, attending to inadvertent cues and ‘eavesdropping’ are widely recognised as instances 
of reducing uncertainty in receivers without X having the function to reduce receiver uncertainty 
(e.g. European starlings learn about patch quality by observing the foraging success of their flock 
members; vervet monkeys gather information about the presence of eagles by eavesdropping on 
the calls of superb starlings). These important sources of biological information systematically 
escape the transmission view. Note also that, while Bergstrom and Rosvall (2011a) make a strong 
case for specific evolutionary functions of DNA, in general it is difficult to establish evolutionary 
functions. Impracticality is a reason for some to reject historical function concepts (e.g. Reeve & 
Sherman, 1993). This may well go too far when the task is metaphysical. But when the task is 
epistemic, as in TMV, impracticality is a cause for concern.  
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